Device-independent quantum key distribution based on asymmetric CHSH
  inequalities by Woodhead, Erik et al.
Device-independent quantum key distribution based on asymmetric CHSH inequalities
Erik Woodhead∗1,2, Antonio Ac´ın2,3, and Stefano Pironio1
1Laboratoire d’Information Quantique, CP 225, Universite´ libre de Bruxelles (ULB),
Av. F. D. Roosevelt 50, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
2ICFO – Institut de Ciencies Fotoniques, The Barcelona Institute of Science and Technology,
08860 Castelldefels (Barcelona), Spain
3ICREA – Institucio Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avanc¸ats, Passeig Lluis Companys 23, 08010 Barcelona, Spain
(Dated: 31 July 2020)
The simplest device-independent quantum key distribution protocol is based on the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) Bell inequality and allows two users, Alice and Bob, to generate a secret key if
they observe sufficiently strong correlations. There is, however, a mismatch between the protocol, in
which only one of Alice’s measurements is used to generate the key, and the CHSH expression, which is
symmetric with respect to Alice’s two measurements. We therefore investigate the impact of using an
extended family of Bell expressions where we give different weights to Alice’s measurements. Using this
family of asymmetric Bell expressions improves the robustness of the key distribution protocol for certain
experimentally-relevant correlations. As an example, the tolerable error rate improves from 7.15% to
about 7.42% for the depolarising channel. Adding random noise to Alice’s key before the postprocessing
pushes the threshold further to more than 8.34%. The main technical result of our work is a tight
bound on the von Neumann entropy of one of Alice’s measurement outcomes conditioned on a quantum
eavesdropper for the family of asymmetric CHSH expressions we consider and allowing for an arbitrary
amount of noise preprocessing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD)
allows distant parties to create and share a cryptographic
key whose security can be proved based only on the detec-
tion of Bell-nonlocal correlations [1–3]. It’s signature fea-
ture is that no assumptions are made about the quantum
state and measurements performed during the security
analysis. DIQKD schemes are, correspondingly, naturally
robust against imperfections and some forms of malicious
tampering with the equipment.
The simplest protocol [3, 4], inspired by a proposal by
Ekert [5], is based around the well-known CHSH Bell in-
equality [6]. In this scheme, pairs of entangled particles are
repeatedly prepared and distributed between two parties,
Alice and Bob. On a random subset of these entangled
pairs, Alice performs one out of two ±1-valued measure-
ments, A1 or A2, on the particles she receives, and Bob
similarly performs randomly one of three ±1-valued meas-
urements B1, B2, or B3. The measurement results are
used to estimate the value of the CHSH correlator,
S = 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉+ 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 , (1)
as well as the value of the correlator 〈A1B3〉, where
〈AxBy〉 = P (Ax = By) − P (Ax 6= By) and P (Ax = By)
and P (Ax 6= By) are the probability that the outcomes of
the measurements Ax and By are equal and different, re-
spectively. On the remaining subset of entangled particles,
Alice always performs the measurement A1 and Bob al-
ways perform the measurement B3. The corresponding
outcomes are then used to generate, after classical post-
processing, a shared secret key known only to Alice and
Bob. This is possible if the estimates of the correlator
∗erik.woodhead@ulb.ac.be
〈A1B3〉 and of the CHSH values are both sufficiently large.
Indeed, the first condition implies that the raw outcomes
of Alice and Bob are correlated enough to be turned into
a shared key using classical error correction. A strong
CHSH value implies, on the other hand, that their out-
comes are only weakly correlated to a potential adversary
and thus that the key can be made almost ideally secret
using privacy amplification.
This tradeoff between the CHSH expression and the ad-
versary’s knowledge, which forms the basis of the security,
can be expressed as the following tight bound
H(A1|E) ≥ 1− φ
(√
S2/4− 1
)
, (2)
on the von Neumann entropy of Alice’s outcome condi-
tioned on an eavesdropper’s quantum side information,
where
φ(x) = 1− 12 (1+x) log2(1+x)− 12 (1−x) log2(1−x) (3)
is a function related to the binary entropy by φ(x) =
h
(
1
2 +
1
2x
)
. This bound is device-independent in that
it is valid independently of the measurements A1, A2,
B1, B2 performed by Alice and Bob and the state they
share, which could be arbitrarily entangled with the ad-
versary, under the constraint of the observed CHSH value
S observed between Alice and Bob.
The bound (2) is not only of fundamental interest. It
has recently been shown through the Entropy Accumu-
lation Theorem (EAT) [7] (see also [8]) that proving un-
conditional security in the finite-key regime of a DIQKD
protocol consisting of n measurement runs can be entirely
reduced to bounding the conditional von Neumann en-
tropy as a function of a Bell expression, exactly as (2)
does for the CHSH case.
Furthermore, a bound on the conditional von Neumann
entropy directly translates into a bound on the rate at
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
16
14
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
31
 Ju
l 2
02
0
which key bits can be generated securely per key genera-
tion round in the asymptotic limit of many runs n→∞.
Indeed, the rates derived from the EAT approach in this
asymptotic limit (up to terms that are sublinearly decreas-
ing in n) the Devetak-Winter rate [9, 10]
r = H(A1|E)−H(A1|B3) , (4)
where H(A1|B3) is the conditional Shannon entropy as-
sociated with probabilities P (ab|13) that Alice and Bob
jointly obtain the outcomes a and b when they measure A1
and B3. The Devetak-Winter rate is saturated by a class
of attacks, called collective attacks, where an eavesdropper
attacks the protocol in an i.i.d. fashion, but where the
eavesdropper can retain quantum side information indef-
initely. Inserting the bound (2) in the Devetak-Winter
rate (4) gives the tight lower bound
r ≥ 1− φ
(√
S2/4− 1
)
−H(A1|B3) (5)
on the asymptotic key rate for the CHSH protocol in
terms of the CHSH parameter S and H(A1|B3). It is pos-
itive for sufficiently high values of S and sufficiently good
correlations between the outcomes of the measurements
A1 and B3.
The lower bound (5) on the Devetak-Winter rate for the
CHSH-based protocol was first presented in [3] and derived
in detail in [4]. The main result of [3, 4] was essentially1
a derivation of the bound (2) on the conditional entropy
H(A1|E) through an explicit attack saturating it (thus
establishing the tightness of the bound).
The main result presented in this paper is a tight bound
on the conditional von Neumann entropy that extends
the bound (2) in two ways. First, it generalises it to the
family of CHSH-like expressions [11]
Sα = α〈A1B1〉+ α〈A1B2〉+ 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 , (6)
where α ∈ R is a parameter that can be chosen freely (α =
1 corresponds to the regular CHSH expression). Second, it
incorporate an arbitrary level of noise preprocessing [10].
A first motivation for considering these generalisations
is purely theoretical. While we now understand how the
security of a generic DIQKD protocol can be reduced
to computing bounds on the conditional von Neumann
entropy (or more precisely the derivation of what the au-
thors of [7] call min-tradeoff functions), obtaining tight or
reasonably good bounds beyond the already solved case of
the CHSH expression, the simplest Bell expression, is chal-
lenging [12–14]. Our work shows how the von Neumann
entropy can be computed for a new class of protocols and
our approach, which partly relies on reducing the prob-
lem to the well-known BB84 protocol [15], might inspire
further, more general, results.
1More precisely, Ref. [4] derived the tight bound χ(A1 : E) ≤
φ
(√
S2/4− 1) on the Holevo quantity assuming a symmetrisa-
tion procedure is applied in the protocol. This was necessary
in [4] as the Holevo bound no longer generally holds if Alice’s
measurement outcomes are not equiprobable. By contrast, the
analogue (2) that we state here for the conditional von Neumann
entropy holds generally and this will also be a feature of the
more general bound we derive in this work.
A second motivation is more practical. Demonstrating
a working and secure device-independent protocol remains
technologically highly challenging [16, 17] as it requires
entangled particles to be distributed and detected with
low noise and a high detection rate over long distances.
Our results lead to two refinements to the CHSH-based
protocol that ease these demands.
The first refinement, basing the security analysis on the
extended family (6) of Bell expressions, is motivated by
the tightness of (2). While the entropy bound (2) can
be attained with equality, the eavesdropping strategy [3]
that achieves it produces asymmetric correlations. For the
optimal collective attack, the two-body correlators in the
CHSH expression are related to the CHSH expectation
value S by
〈A1B1〉 = 2
S
, 〈A1B2〉 = 2
S
, (7)
〈A2B1〉 = S
2/2− 2
S
, 〈A2B2〉 = −S
2/2− 2
S
. (8)
This reflects an asymmetry in the protocol: Alice uses
the A1 measurement to generate the key while A2 is only
used for parameter estimation. To mitigate this, instead
of using only CHSH we will consider the extended family
of Bell expressions (6) where a different weight α ∈ R is
given to the correlation terms involving A1.
Bounding the conditional entropy for the family (6)
and then choosing whichever value of α gives the highest
result amounts to the same as bounding the conditional
entropy in terms of the combinations 〈A1B1〉+〈A1B2〉 and
〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 viewed as independent parameters. In
general, it has been observed that using more information
about the statistics can improve the performance of a
device-independent cryptography protocol [18, 19].
The second refinement, noise preprocessing, consists of
a classical change to the protocol in which Alice randomly
flips each of her key bits intended for key generation with
some probability q, known publicly, before the classical
postprocessing to distill the secret key is applied. Noise
preprocessing is known to improve the robustness of QKD
protocols [10]. Intuitively, adding random noise to Alice’s
outcomes makes things worse (increases H(A1|B3)) for
Alice and Bob, but it also makes things worse (increases
H(A1|E)) for the eavesdropper and it turns out the result
can be a net increase to the key rate.
Both refinements are simply incorporated to the stand-
ard DIQKD protocol of [3] given our generalisation of the
conditional entropy bound (2) for the family Sα of Bell
expressions with noise preprocessing. As we will see in our
case, deriving the entropy bound essentially reduces to
deriving the conditional entropy bound for the well-known
BB84 [15] QKD protocol. We give a short outline of how
this works for the entropy bound (2) for CHSH in sec-
tion III before giving the full derivation of our main result
in section IV. We then derive some examples of its effect
on the robustness of the DIQKD protocol in section V.
2
II. THE ENTROPY BOUND
Let Alice, Bob, and an adversary, Eve, share some ar-
bitrary tripartite state ρABE, and let A1 and A2 be two
arbitrary binary-valued2 measurements on Alice’s system
and B1 and B2 two arbitrary binary-valued measurements
on Bob’s system. We can think of the state and meas-
urements as chosen by Eve. Without loss of generality
we may assume the measurements to be projective (if
necessary by increasing the Hilbert space dimensions).
If Alice measures A1 and flips her outcome with prob-
ability q ∈ [0, 1], the correlations between Alice and Eve
are described by the classical-quantum state
τAE = [0]A ⊗ (q¯ρ0E + qρ1E) + [1]A ⊗ (qρ0E + q¯ρ1E) , (9)
where q¯ = 1 − q, [0] and [1] are shorthand for classical
register states |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1|, and
ρaE = TrAB[ΠaρABE] , (10)
where Π0,1 = (1 ± A1)/2 are the projectors associated
with Alice’s A1 measurement.
The conditional entropy of Alice’s final outcome condi-
tioned on Eve’s knowledge is then defined as
H(A1|E) = S(τAE)− S(τE) (11)
where τE = TrA[τAE] =
∑
a ρ
a
E = ρE is Eve’s average
reduced state, S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log2(ρ)] is the von Neumann
entropy, and log2 is the logarithm function in base 2.
The main result that we derive is a family of lower
bounds
H(A1|E) ≥ g¯q,α(Sα) (12)
on the conditional von Neumann entropy in terms of the
expectation value (6) of the Bell expression Sα computed
on the reduced state ρAB = TrE[ρABE], valid for any values
of the parameters α ∈ R and q ∈ [0, 1]. These bounds
hold for any state ρABE and measurements A1, A2, B1,
B2 and are hence device independent.
The function g¯q,α is piecewise defined and its construc-
tion is described below and illustrated for q = 0 and
α = 0.9 in figure 1. As a way of explaining its form,
we introduce it via a strategy that we considered as a
candidate for the optimal collective attack.
The strategy is a minor modification of the optimal
attack [3, 4] saturating the CHSH bound (2). Eve prepares
a pure tripartite state ρABE = |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE| of the form
|Ψ〉ABE = 1√
2
(
|00〉AB|ψ0〉E + |11〉AB|ψ1〉E
)
, (13)
where the strength of the attack is determined by the
overlap
〈ψ0|ψ1〉 = F ∈ [0, 1] . (14)
2In the following, we freely switch back and forth from a description
where Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results take the values
{0, 1} or the values {+1,−1}. This is just a convention and the
choice depends on what is more convenient in terms of notation.
Alice and Bob then measure
A1 = Z , A2 = X (15)
and
B1 = cos
(
ϕB
2
)
Z + sin
(
ϕB
2
)
X , (16)
B2 = cos
(
ϕB
2
)
Z− sin(ϕB2 )X , (17)
where Z and X are the eponymous Pauli operators and
ϕB is an angle that we will optimise momentarily. The
classical-quantum state after Alice measures A1 and flips
her outcome with probability q is thus given by (9) with
ρaE = ψa, where ψa is a shorthand for |ψa〉〈ψa|. The
conditional entropy (11) can then directly be computed
in terms of the overlap F to be
H(A1|E) = 1 + φ
(√
(q¯ − q)2 + 4qq¯F 2)− φ(F ) . (18)
On the other hand, the marginal state of Alice and Bob is
ρAB =
1
4
[
1⊗ 1+ Z⊗ Z + F (X⊗X−Y ⊗Y)] . (19)
For the above measurements and choosing an optimal
angle ϕB that maximises the expectation value of Sα, we
find
Sα = 2α cos
(
ϕB
2
)
+ 2F sin
(
ϕB
2
)
= 2
√
α2 + F 2 , (20)
which rearranges for F to
F =
√
S 2α /4− α2 . (21)
Substituting (21) into (18), we find that the conditional
entropy is related to Sα for the particular strategy we
have described by
H(A1|E) = gq,α(Sα) , (22)
where
gq,α(s) = 1 + φ
(√
(1− 2q)2 + 4q(1− q)(s2/4− α2)
)
− φ
(√
s2/4− α2
)
. (23)
A little consideration shows that the above strategy
cannot be the optimal one minimising the entropy in
all cases. The Bell expression Sα has the classical and
quantum bounds [11]
Cα =
{
2|α| if |α| ≥ 1
2 if |α| ≤ 1 and Qα = 2
√
1 + α2 . (24)
At the quantum maximum Sα = Qα we find gq,α(Qα) = 1,
i.e., the eavesdropper has no knowledge whatsoever about
Alice’s outcome as we would naturally expect for any
conceivable strategy.
At the classical boundary Sα = Cα, we would expect an
optimal attack to yield H(A1|E) = h(q) since Alice and
Bob’s correlations can be attained with a deterministic
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Figure 1: Conditional von Neumann entropy H(A1|E) as
a function on the observed value of Sα given by our
explicit attack, illustrated here for q = 0 and α = 0.9,
which is representative for values |α| < 1. The dashed
line is a plot of (23). It is visibly too high to be the
optimal device-independent strategy for all Sα given
that the real curve must be convex and attain h(q) = 0
at the classical bound Sα = 2. To get the correct
relation, we use the tangent of gq,α for values of Sα less
than the point S∗ where the tangent intersects the point(
H(A1|E), Sα
)
=
(
h(q), 2
)
. For q = 0 and α = 0.9 this
happens at S∗ ≈ 2.4634.
strategy and the only randomness in Alice’s outcome then
comes from the noise preprocessing. The function (23)
attains
gq,α(Sα) = h(q) (25)
at Sα = 2|α|. If |α| ≥ 1, this is the same as the clas-
sical bound and there is no problem. However, if |α| < 1
then the classical bound is Cα = 2 and the value of
gq,α(Sα) at Sα = 2 is too high to describe the optimal
strategy. However, we can improve it by taking probabil-
istic mixtures of the above strategy with the classical one
achieving H(A1|E) = h(q) at Sα = 2. Geometrically we
are considering, in the plane
(
Sα, H(A1|E)
)
, the convex
hull of the points
(
Sα, gq,α(Sα)
)
and
(
2, h(q)
)
. As illus-
trated in figure 1, this amounts to extending the curve
gq,α(s) linearly from the point where its tangent intersects
H(A1|E) = h(q) at Sα = 2.
Our main result, which we prove in section IV, is that
the explicit attack that we just described is optimal. That
is, the construction shown in figure 1 gives the device-
independent lower bound on the conditional entropy for
all |α| < 1 while the bound is simply given by gq,α(Sα)
for |α| ≥ 1.
Summarising in mathematical terms, the conditional
von Neumann entropy following an amount q of noise
preprocessing is bounded in terms of Sα by
H(A1|E) ≥ g¯q,α(Sα) , (26)
where g¯ ≡ g¯q,α is defined in terms of
g(s) = 1 + φ
(√
(1− 2q)2 + 4q(1− q)(s2/4− α2)
)
− φ
(√
s2/4− α2
)
(27)
as
g¯(s) =
{
g(s) if |α| ≥ 1 or s ≥ s∗
h(q) + g′(s∗)(|s| − 2) if |α| < 1 and s < s∗
,
(28)
where in turn g′ ≡ g′q,α is the first derivative of g ≡ gq,α
and, for |α| < 1, s∗ ≡ s∗(q, α) is the unique point where
the tangent of g(s) crosses h(q) at s = 2, i.e., such that
h(q) + g′(s∗)(s∗ − 2) = g(s∗) . (29)
We note that it is sufficient to consider s∗ in the range
2
√
1 + α2 − α4 ≤ s∗ ≤ 2
√
1 + α2 . (30)
The upper bound corresponds to the quantum maximal
value; the origin of the lower bound will be explained at
the end of section IV. The attack strategy we started with
shows that the entropy bound (26) is tight and can be
attained for any values of the parameters q and α.
For given correlations, g¯q,α(Sα) can be maximised over
α to obtain the best bound on the conditional entropy in
terms of 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉 and 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 seen as
separate parameters. The result for q = 0 and correlations
satisfying
〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉 = 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 = S/2 (31)
is shown and compared with the CHSH entropy bound
(2) in figure 2.
III. SHORT DERIVATION FOR CHSH
In the special case of the CHSH expression (α = 1) and
that no noise preprocessing is applied (q = 0), the von
Neumann entropy bound (26) and main result of this
paper simplifies to
H(A1|E) ≥ 1− φ
(√
S2/4− 1
)
. (32)
Before proving the main result (26) we give a short de-
rivation here for the special case (32). We do this partly
just to show that there is a much simpler way to derive
(32) than the approach originally followed in [4]; it also
can serve as an outline for the full derivation of (26) that
we undertake in section IV. The derivation is a simplified
version3 of one done in [20] for a prepare-and-measure
version of the CHSH-based protocol.
3In terms of the notation and basis choices we use in this section,
[20] essentially did the prepare-and-measure analogue of deriving
|〈Y ⊗ Y〉| ≥ √S2/4− 1 and combining this with the BB84
bound Hmin(Z|E) ≥ 1− log2
(
1 +
√
1− 〈Y ⊗Y〉2) for the min-
entropy. Ref. [20] concentrated on bounding the min-entropy
due to a complication that made it much more difficult to tightly
bound the conditional von Neumann entropy in the prepare-
and-measure setting. Some discussion of this can be found in
chapter 4 of [21].
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Figure 2: Lower bound on the conditional von Neumann
entropy in terms of the CHSH expectation value using
the CHSH entropy bound (2) (dashed line) and the
bound (26) for the Sα family for q = 0 and the optimal
value of α (solid line) for correlations satisfying 〈A1B1〉+
〈A1B2〉 = 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 = S/2. The optimal value
of α decreases from 1 to about 0.84 as S goes from 2
to about 2.7 and then increases back to 1 again as S
approaches 2
√
2.
The main idea is that we can reduce deriving (32) to
bounding the conditional entropy for the well-known BB84
protocol [15]. To do this, we exploit two facts that are by
now well established for this problem: first, we can assume
without loss of generality that Alice’s and Bob’s meas-
urements are projective and, second, since both parties
perform only two dichotomic measurements to estimate
CHSH, we can use the Jordan lemma to reduce the ana-
lysis to qubit systems.
Concentrating on qubit systems, then, we know from
security analyses of the BB84 protocol (see e.g. [22] or
[23, 24]) that the conditional entropy of the outcome of a
Pauli Z measurement by Alice is lower bounded by
H(Z|E) ≥ 1− φ(|〈X⊗X〉|) (33)
in terms of the correlation 〈X⊗X〉 between the outcomes of
Pauli X measurements performed by Alice and Bob on the
same initial state. To apply (33) to the device-independent
protocol we need to identify Alice’s measurement A1 with
Z. Since we assume the measurements are projective this
is straightforward to justify: the CHSH inequality cannot
be violated if any of the measurements are degenerate and
thus must all be linear combinations of the Pauli operators.
The only basis-independent properties characterising the
measurements then are the angles between them on the
Bloch sphere. We can therefore choose the local bases in
such a way that
A1 = Z , (34)
A2 = cos(ϕA)Z + sin(ϕA)X (35)
and
B1 +B2 = 2 cos
(
ϕB
2
)
Z , (36)
B1 −B2 = 2 sin
(
ϕB
2
)
X (37)
where ϕA and ϕB are unknown angles. With this choice
of bases, the CHSH expectation value can be expressed
as and then bounded by
S = 〈A1(B1 +B2)〉+ 〈A2(B1 −B2)〉
= 2 cos
(
ϕB
2
)〈Z⊗ Z〉+ 2 cos(ϕA) sin(ϕB2 )〈Z⊗X〉
+ 2 sin(ϕA) sin
(
ϕB
2
)〈X⊗X〉
≤ 2
√
〈Z⊗ Z〉2 + 〈Z⊗X〉2 + 〈X⊗X〉2
≤ 2
√
1 + 〈X⊗X〉2 , (38)
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and that
cos
(
ϕB
2
)2
+
[
cos(ϕA) sin
(
ϕB
2
)]2
+
[
sin(ϕA) sin
(
ϕB
2
)]2
= 1
(39)
to get to the third line and a constraint
〈Z⊗ Z〉2 + 〈Z⊗X〉2 ≤ 1 (40)
respected by correlations between Pauli operators to get
to the fourth. The inequality (38) rearranges to a lower
bound
|〈X⊗X〉| ≥
√
S2/4− 1 (41)
for the absolute value |〈X⊗X〉| of the correlator appearing
in the BB84 entropy bound (33). Since we chose the bases
in such a way as to identify A1 with Z, we simply substitute
(41) into (33) to obtain (32). The convexity of the result in
S then allows the qubit bound to be extended to arbitrary
dimension through Jordan’s lemma.
IV. DERIVATION OF MAIN RESULT
The short derivation for CHSH above illustrates the gen-
eral approach and kinds of technical ingredients we will
work with to obtain a proof of the main result (26). A
summary of the key steps is:
• We reduce the problem to one where Alice’s and
Bob’s subsystems are qubits.
• We need a generalisation of the BB84 entropy bound
(33) allowing for noise preprocessing (q 6= 0).
• We derive constraints on correlations between Pauli
operators that we can work with, such as (40), in
order to transform the Sα family of Bell expressions
into a bound for a correlator |〈X⊗B〉| that we can
use in the BB84 entropy bound.
• Finally, in order to extend to arbitrary dimension,
we should strictly speaking determine whether the
resulting qubit bound is convex and, if it is not, take
its convex hull.
5
A. Reduction to qubits
Following the approach used in many studies of the CHSH
Bell scenario, we start by reducing the problem to one
where Alice and Bob perform qubit measurements. We
recapitulate how this works here.
The reduction is based on the Jordan lemma [25], which
tells us that any pair A1, A2 of observable operators whose
eigenvalues are all ±1 admit a common block diagonal-
isation in blocks of dimension no larger than two. That
is, there is a choice of bases in which the observables
appearing in the Sα Bell expression can be expressed as
Ax =
∑
j
Ax|j ⊗ [j]A′ , x = 1, 2 , (42)
By =
∑
k
By|k ⊗ [k]B′ , y = 1, 2 (43)
for qubit operators Ax|j and By|k4. Proofs of this result
can be found in [4, 26, 27].
After Alice measures A1 and flips her outcome with
probability q, we remind that the correlation between
Alice and Eve is described by the classical-quantum state
τAE = [0]A ⊗ (q¯ρ0E + qρ1E) + [1]A ⊗ (qρ0E + q¯ρ1E) , (44)
where
ρaE = TrAB[ΠaρABE] (45)
and Π0,1 = (1±A1)/2 are the projectors associated with
Alice’s A1 measurement. Introducing the block diagonal-
isation, we can reexpress ρaE as
ρaE =
∑
jk
pjkρ
a
jk (46)
where5
pjk = Tr
[
[jk]A′B′ ρABE
]
, (47)
pjk ρ
a
jk = TrAB
[
(Πa ⊗ [jk]A′B′)ρABE
]
. (48)
This allows us to reexpress τAE as
τAE =
∑
jk
pjk τjk , (49)
where
τjk = [0]A ⊗ (q¯ρ0jk + qρ1jk) + [1]A ⊗ (qρ0jk + q¯ρ1jk) . (50)
The expectation value of Sα similarly decomposes ac-
cording to
Sα =
∑
jk
pjkSα|jk (51)
4For simplicity we ignore possible 1× 1 Jordan blocks; any such
blocks can be grouped together into larger 2× 2 blocks. Since
the analysis we intend to perform is also device independent we
can also assume Alice’s and Bob’s Hilbert spaces are of even
dimension without loss of generality, extending them if necessary.
5Here A′ and B′ are subspaces, respectively, of A and B. When
taking the product of operators such as [jk]A′B′ ρABE, we omit
in the notation identity operators on unspecified subspaces. That
is, [jk]A′B′ ρABE = (1A¯ ⊗ [j]A′ ⊗ 1B ⊗ [j]B′ ⊗ 1E) ρABE, where
A¯ = A \A′ and B¯ = B \ B′.
where Sα|jk is the contribution to Sα from the pair (j, k)
of Jordan blocks. Importantly, the expectation value Sα|jk
and classical-quantum state τjk conditioned on the Jordan
blocks are both determined by the same conditional state
pjk ρABE|jk = TrA′B′
[
[jk]A′B′ ρABE
]
(52)
where Alice’s and Bob’s subsystems are qubits. This
allows us to reduce the entire problem to qubit systems.
More precisely, suppose we have derived a lower bound
H(A1|E) ≥ g¯(Sα) (53)
for the conditional entropy for qubit systems that is con-
vex6. Then, concavity of the conditional von Neumann
entropy and the convexity of g¯ imply in arbitrary dimen-
sion
H(A1|E)τ ≥
∑
jk
pjkH(A1|E)τjk
≥
∑
jk
pjk g¯(Sα|jk)
≥ g¯
(∑
jk
pjk Sα|jk
)
= g¯(Sα) . (54)
B. BB84 entropy bound
We now derive the required BB84 entropy bound including
noise preprocessing. The result we derive here is the
following. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Eve share a
tripartite state ρABE, that Alice’s subsystem is limited to
a two-dimensional Hilbert space, and that Alice performs
a Pauli Z measurement on her subsystem (in some chosen
basis) and flips the outcome with probability q. Then,
the von Neumann entropy H(Z|E) of Alice’s outcome
conditioned on Eve’s quantum side information is bounded
by
H(Z|E) ≥ 1 + φ
(√
(1− 2q)2 + 4q(1− q)|〈X⊗B〉|2
)
− φ(|〈X⊗B〉|) , (55)
where
〈X⊗B〉 = Tr[(X⊗B)ρAB] (56)
is the correlation between the Pauli X observable on Alice’s
side and any ±1-valued observable B on Bob’s side com-
puted on their part ρAB of the initial state ρABE. Note
that, for q = 0, (55) simplifies to the more familiar BB84
bound
H(Z|E) ≥ 1− φ(|〈X⊗B〉|) (57)
that we used in the outline in section III.
Before proving (55) we draw attention to a few of its
properties that are important for us here:
1. (55) holds for any initial state ρABE. In particular, we
do not assume that Alice’s and Bob’s marginal ρAB
must respect any symmetries or that the outcomes
of any measurements they could perform on it must
be equiprobable.
6If we have a bound that is not convex we take its convex hull.
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2. The right side of (55) is a monotonically increasing
function in the argument |〈X ⊗ B〉|. This means
that if we know a (nonnegative) lower bound for the
argument |〈X⊗B〉| then we can safely substitute it
into (55) to obtain a lower bound for the conditional
entropy.
3. Although we will later only need to apply it to bi-
partite qubit systems, we remark that (55) is fully
device independent on Bob’s side.
A derivation of (55) written for the prepare-and-measure
version of the BB84 protocol that is device-independent
on Bob’s side already exists [28]; we simply restate it here
for the entanglement-based setting that we are working in
and modify it to confirm that the result still holds even if
Alice’s measurement outcomes are not equiprobable, i.e.,
that property 1 holds. Property 2 only concerns the end
result and was already pointed out in [28]; appendix B
of [28] in particular proves that (55) is convex in the
argument 〈X ⊗ B〉 and attains its global minimum at
〈X⊗B〉 = 0. This is also implied by lemma 1 presented
later in subsection B.
We start with the fact that we can assume Alice, Bob,
and Eve initially share a state |Ψ〉ABE that is pure; this can
be justified, for instance, by the fact that the conditional
entropy cannot increase if we purify the initial state and
give the extension to Eve. Next, using that Alice’s system
is a qubit, we express the state as
|Ψ〉ABE = |0〉A ⊗ |ψ0〉BE + |1〉A ⊗ |ψ1〉BE , (58)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the eigenstates of Z and the states
|ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are normalised so that ‖ψ0‖2 + ‖ψ1‖2 = 1.
We don’t assume |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are orthogonal to one
another. The correlation between Alice and Eve after
Alice measures Z and flips the outcome with probability
q is described by the classical-quantum state
τAE = [0]A ⊗ (q¯ψE0 + qψE1 ) + [1]A ⊗ (qψE0 + q¯ψE1 ) , (59)
where ψEa = TrB[ψa].
To simplify the end result, we use that the conditional
entropy H(Z|E)τ of (59) is identical to the conditional
entropy H(Z|E)τ ′ of a state
τ ′AE = [1]⊗ (q¯ψE0 + qψE1 ) + [0]⊗ (qψE0 + q¯ψE1 ) (60)
which is identical to (59) except with [0] and [1] swapped.
Furthermore, the entropy in both cases is the same as the
conditional entropy H(Z|EF)τ¯ computed on a symmet-
rised state
τ¯AEF =
1
2τZE ⊗ [0]F + 12τ ′ZE ⊗ [1]F . (61)
That is, one can verify that
H(Z|EF)τ¯ = 12H(Z|E)τ + 12H(Z|E)τ ′ = H(Z|E)τ . (62)
Hence, we can bound H(Z|E) by deriving a lower bound
for the conditional entropy H(Z|EF)τ¯ of (61).
Grouping the terms in [0]A and [1]A together we rewrite
τ¯ as
τ¯AEF =
1
2 [0]A⊗ (q¯σ= +qσ6=)+ 12 [1]A⊗ (qσ= + q¯σ6=) (63)
with
σ= = ψ
E
0 ⊗ [0]F + ψE1 ⊗ [1]F , (64)
σ6= = ψE1 ⊗ [0]F + ψE0 ⊗ [1]F , (65)
which are normalised to Tr[σ=] = Tr[σ 6=] = 1. Next, we
use that
H(Z|EF) ≥ H(Z|BEFF′) (66)
for any extension of (63), i.e., any state τ¯ABEFF′ such that
TrBF′ [τ¯ABEFF′ ] = τ¯AEF . (67)
Specifically, we use
τ¯ABEFF′ =
1
2 [0]A ⊗ (q¯χ= + qχ6=) + 12 [1]A ⊗ (qχ= + q¯χ6=)
(68)
where we replace σ= and σ6= in (63) with purifications
|χ=〉 = |ψ0〉BE ⊗ |00〉FF′ + |ψ′1〉BE ⊗ |11〉FF′ , (69)
|χ 6=〉 = |ψ′1〉BE ⊗ |00〉FF′ + |ψ0〉BE ⊗ |11〉FF′ (70)
where, in turn,
|ψ′1〉 = B ⊗ 1E|ψ1〉 (71)
and B is a (any) Hermitian operator satisfying B2 = 1B.
Direct computation of the conditional entropy on the state
(68) gives
H(Z|E) ≥ H(Z|BEFF′)
= S(τ¯ABEFF′)− S(τ¯BEFF′)
= 1 + 12S
(
q¯χ= + qχ6=
)
+ 12S
(
qχ= + q¯χ6=
)
− S( 12 (χ= + χ6=))
= 1 + φ
(√
(q¯ − q)2 + 4qq¯ ∣∣〈χ=|χ 6=〉∣∣2)
− φ(∣∣〈χ=|χ 6=〉∣∣) . (72)
Finally, we obtain the result (55) by observing, using the
expression (58) for the initial state |Ψ〉ABE, that
〈χ=|χ6=〉 = 〈ψ0|B ⊗ 1E|ψ1〉+ 〈ψ1|B ⊗ 1E|ψ0〉
= 〈Ψ|X⊗B ⊗ 1E|Ψ〉ABE
= 〈X⊗B〉 . (73)
Before returning to the device-independent protocol we
remark that the BB84 entropy bound (55) is tight and can
be attained with, for example, B = X and any tripartite
state of the form
|Ψ〉ABE = 1
2
[√
1 + Ezz
√
1 + Exx |φ+〉AB|++〉E
+
√
1 + Ezz
√
1− Exx |φ−〉AB|+−〉E
+
√
1− Ezz
√
1 + Exx |ψ+〉AB|−+〉E
+
√
1− Ezz
√
1− Exx |ψ−〉AB|−−〉E
]
, (74)
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where
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(
|00〉 ± |11〉
)
, (75)
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(
|01〉 ± |10〉
)
(76)
are the Bell states, for Exx = 〈X ⊗ X〉 and any value
−1 ≤ Ezz ≤ 1 of Ezz = 〈Z ⊗ Z〉. One can verify that
Alice’s and Bob’s marginal of (74) is
ΨAB =
1
4
[
1⊗ 1+ Exx X⊗X
− ExxEzz Y ⊗Y + Ezz Z⊗ Z
]
. (77)
This is the entanglement-based version of a family of
optimal attacks originally derived in the first security
proof of the BB84 protocol against individual attacks
[29]. The attack state (13) that we applied to the device-
independent protocol in section II corresponds to the
special case of (74) with Ezz = 1. In both cases, the
attack strategy is independent of the amount of noise
preprocessing applied.
C. Correlations in the Z-X plane
As we saw in the outline, the BB84 bound effectively
reduces the problem of bounding the conditional entropy
to applying quantum-mechanical constraints on correla-
tions that can appear in the subsystem shared by just
Alice and Bob. We show here that, for any underlying
quantum state, the correlations between the Z and X Pauli
operators always respect the bounds
E 2zz + E
2
zx ≤ 1 , (78)
E 2xz + E
2
xx ≤ 1 , (79)
and (
1− E 2zz − E 2zx
)(
1− E 2xz − E 2xx
)
≥ (EzzExz + EzxExx)2 , (80)
where we have introduced an abbreviated notation Ezz =
〈Z ⊗ Z〉, Ezx = 〈Z ⊗ X〉, and so on for the correlations.
Note that one of these constraints, (78), is the constraint
(40) that we used earlier in the outline.
To prove these constraints we use the fact that, for
normalised Bloch vectors a = (az, ax) and b = (bz, bx),
the linear combinations a · σ and b · σ have eigenvalues
±1. It follows that, for any state,〈
(a · σ)⊗ (b · σ)〉 ≤ 1 . (81)
We can rewrite the left side as〈
(a · σ)⊗ (b · σ)〉 = ∑
ij
aibj〈σi ⊗ σj〉
= aTEb , (82)
where E is the 2× 2 matrix of coefficients Eij = 〈σi⊗ σj〉
for i, j ∈ {z, x}. Since the relation
aTEb ≤ 1 (83)
holds for any normalised vectors a = [az, ax]
T and
b = [bz, bx]
T , it necessarily holds for whichever vectors
maximise the left side. Using these implies
‖E‖∞ ≤ 1 . (84)
This is equivalent to the operator inequality EET ≤ 1 or,
put differently, that the matrix
1−EET =
[
1− E 2zz − E 2zx −EzzExz − EzxExx
−EzzExz − EzxExx 1− E 2xz − E 2xx
]
(85)
is positive semidefinite. According to the Sylvester cri-
terion, this is the case if and only if all of its principal
minors are of nonnegative determinant, i.e., if
1− E 2zz − E 2zx ≥ 0 , (86)
1− E 2xz − E 2xx ≥ 0 , (87)
det
[
1−EET ] ≥ 0 . (88)
These are exactly the constraints (78), (79), and (80)
asserted at the beginning of this subsection.
D. Entropy bound for qubits
We are now ready to derive the bound satisfied by the
conditional entropy for qubit systems in terms of the Sα
Bell expression. As we did in the outline, we choose
the bases of Alice’s and Bob’s systems such that their
measurement operators are of the form
A1 = Z , (89)
A2 = cos(ϕA)Z + sin(ϕA)X (90)
and
B1 +B2 = 2 cos
(
ϕB
2
)
Z , (91)
B1 −B2 = 2 sin
(
ϕB
2
)
X . (92)
In this case the expectation value of Sα satisfies
Sα/2 = cos
(
ϕB
2
)
α〈Z⊗ Z〉+ cos(ϕA) sin
(
ϕB
2
)〈Z⊗X〉
+ sin(ϕA) sin
(
ϕB
2
)〈X⊗X〉
≤
√
α2〈Z⊗ Z〉2 + 〈Z⊗X〉2 + 〈X⊗X〉2 . (93)
For |α| ≥ 1, the problem from this point is straightfor-
ward. Using the constraint
〈Z⊗ Z〉2 + 〈Z⊗X〉2 ≤ 1 (94)
from the previous section we obtain
S 2α /4 ≤ α2 + 〈X⊗X〉2 , (95)
which, making the choice B = X, rearranges to
|〈X⊗B〉| ≥
√
S 2α /4− α2 . (96)
Using this in the BB84 entropy bound gives
H(A1|E) ≥ 1 + φ
(√
(1− 2q)2 + 4q(1− q)(S 2α /4− α2)
)
− φ
(√
S 2α /4− α2
)
(97)
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for all |α| ≥ 1 for qubits, and we only need to verify that
the right side is convex in Sα to justify extending the
result to arbitrary dimension. We do this in appendix B.
For |α| < 1 we need to do a bit more work. In this case,
we choose B to be of the form cos(θ)Z + sin(θ)X such that
〈X⊗B〉 = cos(θ)〈X⊗ Z〉+ sin(θ)〈X⊗X〉 . (98)
For the best θ,
|〈X⊗B〉| =
√
〈X⊗ Z〉2 + 〈X⊗X〉2 . (99)
Together with (93), and using the notation and constraints
derived in the previous section, the full problem we want
to solve is
Eα(Sα) =
min.
√
E 2xz + E
2
xx
s.t.

α2E 2zz + E
2
zx + E
2
xx ≥ S 2α /4
E 2zz + E
2
zx ≤ 1
E 2xz + E
2
xx ≤ 1
(1− E 2zz − E 2zx )
× (1− E 2xz − E 2xx )
− (EzzExz + EzxExx)2 ≥ 0
(100)
in the variables Ezz, Ezx, Exz, Exx. The solution to this
optimisation problem is derived in detail in appendix A.
The end result, depending on Sα, is
Eα(Sα) =
√
S 2α /4− α2 (101)
for |Sα| ≥ 2
√
1 + α2 − α4 and
Eα(Sα) =
√
1−
(
1− 1|α|
√
(1− α2)(S 2α /4− 1)
)2
(102)
for |Sα| ≤ 2
√
1 + α2 − α4. Applying this in the BB84
bound (55) gives
H(A1|E) ≥ 1 + φ
(√
(1− 2q)2 + 4q(1− q)Eα(Sα)2
)
− φ(Eα(Sα)) , (103)
with Eα(Sα) given by (101) or (102) depending on the
value of Sα.
The conditional entropy bound (103) is illustrated for
q = 0 and α = 0.9 in figure 3. It visibly has the appearance
of being concave for Sα ≤ 2
√
1 + α2 − α4 and convex for
Sα above this value. We prove in appendix B that this
is generally true of (103) for all q and all |α| < 1. The
device-independent bound in arbitrary dimension is given
by the convex hull of the qubit bound. This implies
that the part of the qubit bound described by (103) and
(102) for Sα ≤ 2
√
1 + α2 − α4, which is concave, may be
ignored and the device-independent bound is thus given
by the construction described at the end of section II and
illustrated in figure 1. In particular, this is where the
lower limit of 2
√
1 + α2 − α4 in the range (30) for the
root-finding problem (29) comes from. The fact that the
qubit entropy bound is convex within the range (30) also
guarantees that the solution to the root-finding problem
(29) is unique.
2 2.2 2.4 2.6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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Figure 3: Conditional entropy bound (103) for q = 0 and
α = 0.9 derived assuming Alice and Bob perform pro-
jective qubit measurements. Its form depends on how
Sα compares to S∗ = 2
√
1 + α2 − α4 ≈ 2.1484: it is
concave and described by (103) and (102) for Sα ≤ S∗
and it is convex and described by (103) and (101) for
Sα ≥ S∗.
As a side remark, we note that the lower bounds on
|〈X⊗B〉| that we just derived in term of Sα can be used
to derive the tight bound for the min-entropy in terms of
Sα. This is discussed in appendix D.
V. APPLICATIONS TO DIQKD KEY RATES
The entropy bound H(A1|E) ≥ g¯q,α(Sα) we have now
proved can be applied in QKD security frameworks that
reduce proving the security of a protocol to bounding
the conditional von Neumann entropy in a single round.
Applying it in the Devetak-Winter rate (4) gives a lower
bound
r ≥ g¯q,α(Sα)−H(A1|B3) (104)
on the asymptotic key rate that depends only on para-
meters – the Bell expectation value Sα and probabilities
P (ab|13) – estimated through cooperation between Alice
and Bob.
In this section, we apply (104) to obtain explicit estim-
ates of the robustness of the device-independent QKD
protocol in two commonly studied imperfection models,
both of which were also used as examples in [4]: depolar-
ising noise, where we assume that the optimal Bell state
for the protocol is mixed with white noise, and a generic
loss model.
All the thresholds we report when using noise prepro-
cessing were computed in the limit q → 1/2 of max-
imal random noise. This typically seems to give the best
threshold and this was what we saw in cases where we
computed the key rate for different amounts of noise pre-
processing, although we have not checked that q → 1/2
is optimal in every case. We describe how the Devetak-
Winter rate can be computed in this limit in appendix C.
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Figure 4: Lower bound (114) on the Devetak-Winter rate
as a function of channel error rate δ, assuming correl-
ations satisfying 〈A1(B1 + B2)〉 = 〈A1(B1 − B2)〉 =√
2(1 − 2δ), for the optimal values of q and α (solid
curve) and for q = 0 and α = 1 (dashed curve).
A. Depolarising noise
In this model we suppose that Alice and Bob share a noisy
version,
ρAB = v φ+ + (1− v) 1AB/4 , (105)
of the optimal two-qubit Bell state
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (106)
parameterised by some visibility v. For the ideal measure-
ments A1 = Z and B3 = Z for key generation, the possible
outcomes are obtained with joint probabilities
P (++|13) = P (−−|13) = (1− δ)/2 , (107)
P (+−|13) = P (−+|13) = δ/2 , (108)
where the error rate δ is related to the visibility in (105)
by
v = 1− 2δ . (109)
When Alice additionally applies noise preprocessing, the
resulting joint distribution retains the same form but with
a worse error rate,
δq = q + (1− 2q)δ . (110)
The conditional Shannon entropy associated with this
distribution is
H(A1|B3) = h(δq) , (111)
depending on the amount q of noise preprocessing applied.
In the CHSH-based protocol, the ideal measurements in
the Bell test are A1 = Z, A2 = X, and B1,2 = (Z±X)/
√
2.
With these measurements the two-body correlation terms
satisfy〈
A1(B1 +B2)
〉
=
〈
A1(B1 −B2)
〉
=
√
2(1− 2δ) , (112)
q = 0 q → 1/2
α = 1 7.1492 8.0848
α = opt 7.4002 8.3320
α,By = opt 7.4177 8.3453
Table 1: Threshold error rates (%) obtained using either
CHSH (α = 1) or the optimal asymmetric expres-
sion (α = αopt), both without (q = 0) and with
maximal (q → 1/2) noise preprocessing. The third
row (α,By = opt) gives the thresholds when in ad-
dition Bob’s measurements are optimised such that
Sα = 2
√
1 + α2(1− 2δ).
which translates to an expectation value
Sα =
√
2(1 + α)(1− 2δ) (113)
of the asymmetric CHSH expression.
The lower bound on the Devetak-Winter rate we obtain
for the depolarising noise model is then explicitly
r ≥ g¯q,α
(√
2(1 + α)(1− 2δ))− h(δq) . (114)
The best possible bound on the key rate is obtained by
maximising the right side of (114) over α and q. We
illustrate the result as a function of the channel noise
rate δ in figure 4. The key rate computed using only
the CHSH bound of [4], i.e., q = 0 and α = 1, is also
shown for comparison. The combination of applying noise
preprocessing and optimising over the Sα family of Bell
expressions increases the threshold error rate, up to which
the key rate remains positive, from δ ≈ 7.15% found in
[4] to 8.33%.
In table 1 we list the threshold error rates obtained
for the different combinations of using CHSH or the op-
timal Sα expressions without or with noise preprocessing.
Table 1 in addition gives the thresholds obtained when
using, instead of the measurements B1,2 = (Z ± X)/
√
2
that are optimal for CHSH, the measurements that attain
the maximal value
Sα = 2
√
1 + α2(1− 2δ) (115)
of the Sα expression for the depolarised state. This gives
marginally better threshold error rates.
Since the conditional entropy bounds used in the above
security analysis are tight, the threshold error rates that
we compute are optimal in terms of the asymmetric CHSH
expressions Sα, and the values reported in table 1 optim-
ised over α are optimal in terms of the combinations
〈A1B1〉 + 〈A1B2〉 and 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 viewed as inde-
pendent parameters. But they are actually also optimal
with respect to an analysis that would take into account
the full set of statistics. This is because according to the
measurement and noise model considered above, Alice’s
and Bob’s marginal measurement outcomes are equiprob-
able, i.e.,
〈A1〉 = 〈A2〉 = 〈B1〉 = 〈B2〉 = 0 , (116)
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and the two-body correlations satisfy
〈A1B1〉 = 〈A1B2〉 (117)
and
〈A2B1〉 = −〈A2B2〉 . (118)
But these relations, which completely fix the full set of
correlators once the independent combinations 〈A1B1〉+
〈A1B2〉 and 〈A2B1〉 − 〈A2B2〉 are specified, are also satis-
fied for the family of optimal attacks presented in section II
and saturating our entropy bound. Thus, specifying other
correlation terms beyond those involved in the definition
of Sα would not restrict the attack strategies further than
already considered.
B. Losses
In this setting, we suppose that Alice and Bob detect their
particles and obtain definite measurement outcomes with
some probability η which, for simplicity, we take to be the
same on both sides. We model this formally by treating
nondetection events as a third measurement outcome,
obtained independently by Alice and Bob with probability
1−η. In this case, as well as the maximally-entangled Bell
state we also consider a possible type of strategy in which
Alice and Bob deliberately use partially-entangled states,
which have been shown to improve the robustness of Bell
experiments based on the CHSH inequality to losses [30].
We consider the maximally-entangled state first. In
order to apply our entropy bound we need to reduce the
setting to one where the measurements used in the Bell
test all have only two outcomes. The typical way to do
this, which we apply here, is to map (“bin”) nondetection
events to one of the outcomes +1 or −1. In terms of the
global detection efficiency η, the maximum value of the Sα
expression over the different possible binning strategies is
Sα =
√
2(1 + α)η2 + 2 max(1, |α|)η¯2 , (119)
where η¯ = 1− η, if Bob uses the diagonal measurements
B1,2 = (Z±X)/
√
2 or
Sα = 2
√
1 + α2 η2 + 2 max(1, |α|)η¯2 (120)
if Bob uses the optimal ones. For the key generation meas-
urements A1 = B3 = Z, Alice and Bob obtain outcomes
(including nondetections) with the joint probabilities
(
PAB(ab|13)
)
=
 12η2 0 12ηη¯0 12η2 12ηη¯
1
2ηη¯
1
2ηη¯ η¯
2
 ; (121)
however, since we map nondetection events to (for ex-
ample) A1 = +1 on Alice’s side to use the entropy bound
we must do the same here, that is, we should add the third
row of (121) to the first. This gives the joint distribution
(
PAB(ab|13)
)
=
[
1
2η
1
2ηη¯
1
2 η¯(1 + η¯)
0 12η
2 1
2ηη¯
]
. (122)
q = 0 q → 1/2
α = 1 90.7768 90.3046
α = opt 90.4970 90.0230
α,By = opt 90.4856 90.0122
Table 2: Threshold detection efficiencies (%) obtained
both without (q = 0) and with maximal q → 1/2
noise preprocessing for the maximally-entangled state.
The first (α = 1) and second (α = opt) rows give the
thresholds obtained using only CHSH and the optimal
asymmetric Bell expression using diagonal measure-
ments (Z ± X)/√2 on Bob’s side. In the third row
(α,By = opt) we also use the optimal measurements on
Bob’s side.
Finally, as before, when noise preprocessing is applied we
also need to swap the rows of (122) with probability q,
i.e., transform (122) according to
PAB(±, b|13) 7→ (1− q)PAB(±, b|13) + qPAB(∓, b|13) ,
(123)
before computing the conditional Shannon entropy
H(A1|B3).
The threshold global detection efficiencies we found
for the resulting Devetak-Winter rate for the maximally-
entangled state are reported in table 2. In this case the
thresholds are all a little over 90% with little variation
depending on whether the Sα family or noise preprocessing
are used. The threshold η ≈ 90.78% that we obtain using
only CHSH and with no noise preprocessing is better
than the threshold η ≈ 92.4% found in [4] as a result
of computing the conditional Shannon entropy on the
full probability distribution (122) without binning the
nondetection event on Bob’s side. It is also slightly better
than the threshold of 90.9% found in [31] due to a small
advantage in bounding the Devetak-Winter rate via the
conditional von Neumann entropy rather than via the
Holevo quantity as was originally done in [4].
We now consider partially-entangled states which, as we
mentioned, are known to increase the robustness to losses
in the CHSH Bell experiment. In this case, we suppose
that Alice and Bob share a state
|ψθ〉 = cos
(
θ
2
)|00〉+ sin( θ2)|11〉 (124)
dependent on a parameter θ characterising the degree of
entanglement. The density operator associated to |ψθ〉 is
ψθ =
1
4
[
1⊗ 1+ cos(θ)(Z⊗ 1+ 1⊗ Z)
+ sin(θ)
(
X⊗X−Y ⊗Y)+ Z⊗ Z] . (125)
We then suppose that Alice and Bob measure A1 = Z
and B3 = Z to generate their key and use whichever
measurements A2, B1, and B2 give the highest expectation
value of the Sα expression given that A1 is fixed to Z and
the global detection efficiency is fixed to some value η. For
this problem, the best thresholds we saw were obtained by
11
mapping all nondetection events to +1. For this binning
strategy, the expectation value of Sα can be expressed as
Sα = η
2
〈
αA1(B1 +B2) +A2(B1 −B2)
〉
+ ηη¯
〈
2αA1 + (α+ 1)B1 + (α− 1)B2
〉
+ 2η¯2α (126)
in terms of η and the expectation values 〈Ax〉, 〈By〉, and
〈AxBy〉 that would be obtained from (124) if there were
no losses. Setting
A2 = cos(ϕA)Z + sin(ϕA)X (127)
and optimising over the measurements B1 and B2 on
Bob’s side gives
Sα = η
√
R2 + (P +Q)2 + η
√
R2 + (P −Q)2
+ 2ηη¯α cos(θ) + 2η¯2α , (128)
where
R = η sin(ϕA) sin(θ) , (129)
P = αη + αη¯ cos(θ) , (130)
Q = η cos(ϕA) + η¯ cos(θ) , (131)
in terms of θ, ϕA, and η. With this strategy, for small
θ7 the expectation value in the special case of CHSH is
approximated by
S ≈ 2 + η
[
3η − 2− ηη¯
(
1− cos(ϕA)
)
2− η(1− cos(ϕA))
]
θ2 (132)
to the smallest nontrivial order in θ, or
S ≈ 2 + η
(
3η − 2− 1
4
ηη¯ϕ 2A
)
θ2 (133)
if ϕA is also small. This shows that the strategy we have
described can violate the CHSH inequality as long as the
global detection efficiency is better than η = 2/3, the same
as was found in [30], although our choice to fix A1 = Z
means that the CHSH violation we can attain is not as
high as it could otherwise be.
The outcomes including nondetections when Alice and
Bob measure A1 = Z and B3 = Z on the partially-
entangled state occur with joint probabilities
(
PAB(ab|13)
)
=
η2c2 0 ηη¯c20 η2s2 ηη¯s2
ηη¯c2 ηη¯s2 η¯2
 (134)
where c2 = cos
(
θ
2
)2
and s2 = sin
(
θ
2
)2
. As before, we
should merge the nondetection events on Alice’s side
with the +1 outcome and swap the rows with probab-
ility q if noise preprocessing is also used before computing
H(A1|B3).
7More precisely, the approximation (132) is valid if |θ| is small
compared to |ϕA|. This means that ϕA can be taken arbitrarily
close to zero as long as θ is taken even smaller. This condition
is also why (132) does not imply that the CHSH inequality can
be violated with ϕA = 0.
q = 0 q → 1/2
α = 1 86.5479 82.5742
α = opt 86.5255 82.5742
Table 3: Threshold detection efficiencies (%) obtained us-
ing either CHSH (α = 1) or the optimal asymmetric
expression (α = opt), both without (q = 0) and with
maximal (q → 1/2) noise preprocessing, for the strategy
using partially-entangled states.
Computing the Devetak-Winter rate using the value
(128) of Sα and maximising the result over θ and ϕA gives
a positive rate up to the global detection efficiencies listed
in table 3. The thresholds for q = 0 are attained for
partially-entangled states with θ a little under 0.5 radians.
The threshold for q → 1/2 by contrast is attained in the
limit θ → 0 of a separable state. The approximations of
the key rate for q = (1 − ε)/2 described in appendix C
and (133) of CHSH for small θ and ϕA can be used to
derive an approximate lower bound,
r & η
6 log(2)
(
3η2 + 6η − 7− 1
2
ηη¯ϕ 2A
)
θ2ε2 , (135)
for the key rate when ε and the angles are small. In this
vicinity the key rate can be positive, albeit minuscule, as
long as the global detection efficiency is better than
η =
√
10/3− 1 ≈ 82.5742% . (136)
For q → 1/2 we didn’t see any improvement to the
threshold when using the Sα family instead of the CHSH
expression.
The results in table 3 should be taken with a pinch of
salt as they were derived assuming only losses occur in an
otherwise perfect experiment, which is not realistic. The
threshold detection efficiency using noise preprocessing
in particular was derived by taking the limit θ → 0 of
a separable state and is accordingly very vulnerable to
noise. To model this, we computed the best thresholds
(i.e., using both noise preprocessing and the Sα family)
when we replace the initial state with an attenuated one
of the form
ρ = v ψθ + (1− v) 1AB/4 . (137)
The threshold detection efficiencies both for θ = pi/2 (the
maximally-entangled state) and for whichever partially-
entangled state gave the best result are illustrated as a
function of the error rate in figure 5. The threshold using
partially-entangled states visibly increases very rapidly
as soon as we add even a small amount of channel noise.
We also recomputed the thresholds of table 3 with the
visibility set to v = 99%, corresponding to a more realistic
error rate of δ = 0.5%. This increases the thresholds,
listed in table 4, to above 87%.
Finally, note that while the conditional entropy bound
we used holds generally, it is only really optimised for the
case that Alice and Bob’s correlations satisfy Eqs. (116)–
(118) and in particular obtain equiprobable measurement
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outcomes. Deterministically binning nondetection events
and deliberately using a partially-entangled state both
spoil this and the real thresholds could actually be signi-
ficantly better than the ones we report here.
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Figure 5: Threshold detection efficiency as a function of
channel noise when partially-entangled states (solid
curve) or maximally-entangled states (dashed curve) are
used. The thresholds start respectively at η ≈ 82.5742%
and η ≈ 90.0122% for δ = 0 and increase to η = 100%
as the error rate approaches δ ≈ 8.3453%. δ is defined
here to be related to the visibility in (137) by v = 1−2δ.
q = 0 q → 1/2
α = 1 88.8316 87.6469
α = opt 88.7149 87.5714
Table 4: Threshold detection efficiencies (%) obtained us-
ing either CHSH (α = 1) or the optimal asymmetric
expression (α = opt), both without (q = 0) and with
maximal (q → 1/2) noise preprocessing, using partially-
entangled states but with a 0.5% channel error rate.
VI. DISCUSSION
In our work we derived a tight lower bound on the con-
ditional von Neumann entropy following an arbitrary
amount of noise preprocessing and for the family Sα of
asymmetric CHSH Bell expressions, which allows us to
make more effective use of the statistics than when using
the standard CHSH expression. Our proof heavily ex-
ploited the similarity of the device-independent protocol
to the entanglement-based version of the BB84 protocol.
Section V showed that these modifications, both indi-
vidually and together, can improve the robustness of the
original CHSH-based protocol using two commonly-used
imperfection models as examples. For a maximally en-
tangled two-qubit state subject to a depolarising-noise
model, the threshold error rate according to our analysis
is just above 8.34%. This is actually the optimal error
rate, equaling a security analysis that takes into account
the full set of statistics.
As is typically the case of research based on the CHSH
Bell setting, our analysis is heavily dependent on the fact
that the setting can be effectively reduced to the study of
bipartite qubit systems. Obviously, it would be interesting
in the future to learn how to derive good bounds for the
conditional von Neumann entropy in Bell settings with
more inputs and/or outputs, where we cannot rely on
such a reduction.
Within the CHSH setting however there are still some
possible avenues for further work. First, while the en-
tropy bound we have derived is tight in terms of the
parameters it depends on, this does not mean it is always
optimal. Our approach in particular is optimised for the
case that Alice’s and Bob’s marginal measurement out-
comes are equiprobable. This is fine if the imperfections
in a real implementation most closely correspond to the
depolarising-noise model but not, as we cautioned in sec-
tion V, if they more closely resemble the loss model. It is
likely that our entropy bound gives suboptimal results in
the latter case.
Our proof, however, has a rather modular nature; parts
of it could no doubt be changed, generalised, or applied to
different problems without affecting other parts. Different
preprocessings could be considered and may only require
changing the derivation of the BB84 bound in section IV.B;
we have not checked, for instance, if flipping both of
Alice’s outcomes with the same probability q is always
the optimal choice. Optimisation problems of the kind
we landed on in section IV.D may lend themselves to
numerical approaches8, although it should be kept in
mind that solving the problem analytically made it much
more straightforward for us to prove when the result was
and was not convex. Lemmas 1 and 2 in appendix B
may help prove the convexity or nonconvexity of entropy
bounds with similar functional forms to what we derived
in section IV.
Second, our approach exploits two refinements – using
more information about the statistics and noise prepro-
cessing – that were already known to improve the per-
formance of cryptography protocols. A third refinement
that we have not exploited here would consist of using
both of Alice’s measurements to generate the key, which
forces an eavesdropper to have to gain information about
both bases without knowing in advance which will be used.
This kind of modification has previously been shown to
improve the average bound on the min-entropy in the
device-independent setting [19].
This variant of the CHSH-based protocol has recently
been considered [13], however the approach of [13] requires
8In particular, Eq. (100) as written is the square root of a poly-
nomial optimisation problem and could in principle be solved
numerically using the Lasserre hierarchy [32]. This would still be
true, albeit the problem larger, if we had not optimised out the
measurements; the sines and cosines of the angles ϕA,B could
still be treated as additional variables satisfying polynomial
constraints c2 + s2 = 1.
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a rather elaborate numerical procedure to bound the key
rate and the threshold error rate of 8.2% reported by the
authors for the depolarising channel does not exceed the
threshold just above 8.34% that we found for the single-
basis version of the protocol using the refinements we
considered here.
We suspect that the result of [13] is not quite optimal,
however, and thus a good candidate for further study.
One possible way to bound the average entropy of Alice’s
measurements for this problem may be to try to apply the
same method we have applied to the single-basis protocol
here. According to a quick numerical test we performed,
the best bound on the average conditional entropy that
could be obtained using only the BB84 entropy bound of
section IV.B and Pauli correlation bounds of section IV.C
should give a slightly better threshold of around 8.36%,
or alternatively up to 9.24% if noise preprocessing is also
used. Even these thresholds do not appear to be optimal,
however. We also performed a brute-force numerical min-
imisation of the average conditional von Neumann entropy.
The results seemed to show that the optimal attack for
qubit systems involves Alice and Bob using measurements
of the form A1,2 = cos
(
ϕA
2
)
Z± sin(ϕA2 )X and B1,2 = Z,X
on an asymmetric version of the optimal BB84 attack
state9, i.e., (74) with different values of Ezz and Exx. In
other words, the tight lower bound on the average entropy
for qubit systems appeared to us to coincide with the
result of minimising
1
2H(A1|E) + 12H(A2|E)
= 1 + φ
(√
cos
(
ϕA
2
)2
E 2zz + sin
(
ϕA
2
)2
E 2xx
)
− φ(Ezz)− φ(Exx) (138)
subject to
2 cos
(
ϕA
2
)
Ezz + 2 sin
(
ϕA
2
)
Exx = S (139)
for a given expectation value S of the CHSH correlator.
Using an estimate of the convex hull of the result of this
minimisation gave us a threshold error rate (without noise
preprocessing) of around 8.44%.
Eqs. (138) and (139) are a little disappointing since they
suggest there is probably not a simple analytic expression
for the tight bound on the average conditional entropy
for the two-basis version of the protocol. Nevertheless,
the thresholds we have estimated numerically suggest
there is some room for improvement in the results of [13],
particularly if noise preprocessing is also used.
Finally, we note that a bound on the entropy bound for
CHSH incorporating noise preprocessing has very recently
been presented in [33] independently of us, although as far
as we could tell [33] does not prove that the bound they
9Section I.H of the supplementary information to Ref. [13] con-
jectures that the reduced state shared by Alice and Bob in the
optimal attack is Bell diagonal with two nonzero eigenvalues,
which would correspond to an attack state like (74) with, e.g.,
Ezz = 1, but this is not consistent with what we found when
minimising the average conditional von Neumann entropy dir-
ectly. The minimum of (138) subject to (139) is generally not
attained with either Ezz = ±1 or Exx = ±1.
derive for qubit systems is convex, as we do here, and their
proof accordingly seems incomplete in this respect. The
result presented there is a special case of the conditional
entropy bound we derived for the Sα family here. In
our approach, we more simply exploited the fact that we
already know how to derive the entropy bound including
noise preprocessing for the BB84 protocol [28].
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A. QUBIT OPTIMISATION PROBLEM
Here we solve the optimisation problem (100) in section IV
of the main text. We first simplify it by introducing polar
coordinates,
Ezz = λ cos(z) , Exz = µ cos(x) , (140)
Ezx = λ sin(z) , Exx = µ sin(x) . (141)
With this change of variables the problem becomes
minimise |µ|
subject to

α2λ2 cos(z)2 + λ2 sin(z)2
+ µ2 sin(x)2 ≥ S 2α /4
λ2 ≤ 1
µ2 ≤ 1
(1− λ2)(1− µ2)
− λ2µ2 cos(z − x)2 ≥ 0
(142)
in the free variables µ, λ, z, and x. From here, it is an
algebra problem to eliminate the unwanted variables λ,
z, and x so that only a constraint between |µ| and the
constants α and Sα remains.
We begin with the first constraint. Using the tri-
gonometric identities cos(x)2 =
(
1 + cos(2x)
)
/2 and
sin(x)2 =
(
1− cos(2x))/2, it can be rewritten
(1 + α2)λ2 + µ2 − (1− α2)λ2 cos(2z)
− µ2 cos(2x) ≥ S 2α /2 . (143)
Substituting Σ = z + x and ∆ = z − x and using the
trigonometric angle sum and difference identities, we get
(1 + α2)λ2 + µ2
−((1− α2)λ2 + µ2) cos(Σ) cos(∆)
− ((1− α2)λ2 − µ2) sin(Σ) sin(∆) ≥ S 2α . (144)
We can then maximise the left-hand side over Σ, which
doesn’t appear in any of the other constraints. After
simplifying a little this gives
(1 + α2)λ2 + µ2
+
√(
(1− α2)λ2 − µ2)2 + 4(1− α2)λ2µ2 cos(∆)2
≥ S 2α /2 , (145)
which we can rearrange to√(
(1− α2)λ2 − µ2)2 + 4(1− α2)λ2µ2 cos(∆)2
≥ ((1− α2)λ2 − µ2)+ 2(S 2α /4− λ2) . (146)
Now note that, if α2 < 1, the term (1− α2)λ2µ2 cos(∆)2
is nonnegative. Hence we also have√(
(1− α2)λ2 − µ2)2 + 4(1− α2)λ2µ2 cos(∆)2
≥ ∣∣(1− α2)λ2 − µ2∣∣
≥ −((1− α2)λ2 − µ2)
≥ −((1− α2)λ2 − µ2)− 2(S 2α /4− λ2) , (147)
15
where we assume that |Sα| ≥ 2 (i.e., Sα is attaining or
exceeding the classical bound) and λ2 ≤ 1 (which is one
of the problem constraints in (142)), which together imply
S 2α /4− λ2 ≥ 0, in order to get the last line. Eqs. (146)
and (147) together confirm that√(
(1− α2)λ2 − µ2)2 + 4(1− α2)λ2µ2 cos(∆)2
≥ ∣∣((1− α2)λ2 − µ2)+ 2(S 2α /4− λ2)∣∣ (148)
holds with the absolute value term on the left. Now, since
the left side of (148) is nonnegative we are justified to
square both sides of the inequality. After doing this and
simplifying the result, we obtain
(1− α2)λ2µ2 cos(∆)2
≥ (S 2α /4− α2λ2 − µ2)(S 2α /4− λ2) . (149)
We now eliminate ∆ from the problem by applying the
constraint
(1− λ2)(1− µ2) ≥ λ2µ2 cos(∆)2 (150)
to the left side of (149), obtaining
(1− α2)(1− λ2)(1− µ2)
≥ (S 2α /4− α2λ2 − µ2)(S 2α /4− λ2) . (151)
Collecting the terms in µ2 together we can rewrite (151)
as
(X + α2Λ)µ2 ≥ X + (X + α2Λ)Λ (152)
where
X = (1− α2)(S 2α /4− 1) , (153)
Λ = S 2α /4− λ2 . (154)
Note that here both X and Λ are strictly positive assuming
λ2 ≤ 1, |S|α > 2, and |α| < 1, and only Λ depends on
the remaining parameter λ. Subject to these conditions,
(152) gives a lower bound for µ2 in terms of λ which we
can express as
µ2 ≥
√
X
|α| f
(
X + α2Λ
|α|√X
)
− X
α2
, (155)
where we have made appear the function
f(t) = t+ 1/t . (156)
The remaining problem is to minimise the right side of
(155) subject to the condition λ2 ≤ 1. This is straight-
forward due to the characteristics of the function f (156)
that we expressed it in terms of: for t > 0, t is convex
and its global minimum of f(t) = 2 is attained at t = 1,
so the lower bound for µ2 is determined by how close we
can make the argument
t =
X + α2Λ
|α|√X (157)
to 1. The limits 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1 translate to
t ≤ α
2 + S 2α /4− 1√
α2(1− α2)(S 2α /4− 1)
(158)
and
t ≥
√
S 2α /4− 1
α2(1− α2) . (159)
The upper limit (158) can be rewritten as
t ≤
√
1 +
α2
(
(1 + α2)S 2α /4− 1
)
+ (S 2α /4− 1)2
α2(1− α2)(S 2α /4− 1)
,
(160)
which makes it clear that the left side is never less than 1.
The lower limit (159) on the other hand may be less than
1 depending on α and Sα. Specifically, if
|Sα| ≤ 2
√
1 + α2 − α4 (161)
then the left side of (159) is not more than 1, in which
case it is possible to choose λ such that t = 1. Recalling
that |µ| = |〈X⊗B〉|, we obtain in this case
〈X⊗B〉2 ≥ 1−
(
1− 1|α|
√
(1− α2)(S 2α /4− 1)
)2
. (162)
On the other hand, if |Sα| ≥ 2
√
1 + α2 − α4 then the
minimum is attained with the smallest value allowed of
the argument,
t =
√
S 2α /4− 1
α2(1− α2) =
√
X
|α|(1− α2) , (163)
in which case the constraint (155) simplifies to the same
expression
|〈X⊗B〉| ≥
√
S 2α /4− α2 , (164)
that we derived in the main text for |α| ≥ 1.
B. CONCAV/EXITY OF THE QUBIT BOUND
Here we prove that (97) and the curve described by (103)
and (101) in section IV, which have the same functional
form, is convex in Sα and that the curve described by
(103) and (102) is concave in Sα. We do this by bounding
their second derivatives. To do this, we recall some con-
ditions under which concavity or convexity are preserved
under function composition. The second derivative of the
composition f ◦ g of two functions is given by
(f ◦ g)′′(x) = f ′′(g(x)) g′(x)2 + f ′(g(x)) g′′(x) . (165)
From this we can see that f ◦ g is guaranteed to be convex
if both f and g are convex and if f is monotonically
increasing. Conversely, f ◦ g is guaranteed to be concave
if f is concave and monotonically decreasing while g is
convex.
We also state the the first and second derivatives of the
function
φ(x) = 1− 12 (1+x) log(1+x)− 12 (1−x) log(1−x) , (166)
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here, which are used in the proofs:
φ′(x) = −1
2
log2
(
1 + x
1− x
)
, (167)
φ′′(x) = − 1
log(2)
1
1− x2 . (168)
With that settled, we prove that the bound given by
(103) and (101) is convex by expressing it as f ◦ g(Sα) for
the function f in lemma 1 below with Q = (1− 2q)2 and
with
g(Sα) = S
2
α /4− α2 , (169)
which is clearly convex. The following result confirms that
f has the properties we require.
Lemma 1. The function
f(x) = 1 + φ
(√
Q+ (1−Q)x
)
− φ(√x) (170)
is convex and monotonically increasing in x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
and for any 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1.
Proof. We express f as
f(x) = 1 + φ(R)− φ(r) (171)
with R =
√
Q+ (1−Q)x and r = √x. The first and
second derivatives of r and R are
r′ =
1
2r
, r′′ = − 1
4r3
, (172)
R′ =
1−Q
2R
, R′′ = − (1−Q)
2
4R3
. (173)
Let us first verify that f is monotonically increasing.
Its first derivative is
f ′(x) = φ′(R)R′ − φ′(r)r′
=
1
2 log(2)
[
−1−Q
2R
log
(
1 +R
1−R
)
+
1
2r
log
(
1 + r
1− r
) ]
. (174)
To change the terms with logs into something easier to
work with we substitute
1
2ξ
log
(
1 + ξ
1− ξ
)
=
∫ 1
0
du
1
1− ξ2u2 (175)
for both ξ = R and ξ = r. Now we only have quotients of
polynomials to worry about:
f ′(x) =
1
2 log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[
− 1−Q
1−R2u2 +
1
1− r2u2
]
=
1
2 log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
Q(1− r2u2)− (R2 − r2)u2
(1− r2u2)(1−R2u2)
=
Q
2 log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
1− u2
(1− r2u2)(1−R2u2)
≥ 0 , (176)
where we used that R2 − r2 = Q(1− r2).
We prove that f is convex in a similar way. Its second
derivative is
f ′′(x) = φ′′(R)R′2 − φ′′(r)r′2
+ φ′(R)R′′ − φ′(r)r′′ . (177)
The first and second lines on the right side evaluate to
φ′′(R)R′2 − φ′′(r)r′2
=
1
4 log(2)
[
− (1−Q)
2
R2(1−R2) +
1
r2(1− r2)
]
(178)
and
φ′(R)R′′ − φ′(r)r′′
=
1
4 log(2)
[
(1−Q)2
R2
1
2R
log
(
1 +R
1−R
)
− 1
r2
1
2r
log
(
1 + r
1− r
) ]
=
1
4 log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[
(1−Q)2
R2(1−R2u2) −
1
r2(1− r2u2)
]
.
(179)
Adding (178) and (179) and using that
1
ξ2(1− ξ2) −
1
ξ2(1− ξ2u2) =
(1− u2)
(1− ξ2)(1− ξ2u2) (180)
for ξ = r and ξ = R and that
1−R2 = (1−Q)(1− r2) (181)
we get
f ′′(x) =
1
4 log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[
− (1−Q)
2(1− u2)
(1−R2)(1−R2u2)
+
1− u2
(1− r2)(1− r2u2)
]
=
1
4 log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
1− u2
1− r2
[
− 1−Q
1−R2u2 +
1
1− r2u2
]
=
1
4 log(2)
Q
1− r2
∫ 1
0
du
(1− u2)2
(1− r2u2)(1−R2u2)
≥ 0 . (182)
We similarly prove that the curve described by (103)
and (102) is concave by expressing it as f ◦ g(Sα) for the
function f in lemma 2 with Q = (1− 2q)2 and
g(Sα) = 1− 1|α|
√
(1− α2)(S 2α /4− 1) . (183)
Checking that g is convex amounts to checking that the
function s 7→ √s2 − 1 is concave, which doesn’t present
any particular problem. The following verifies that f has
the properties we require of it.
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Lemma 2. The function
f(x) = 1 + φ
(√
1− (1−Q)x2
)
− φ
(√
1− x2
)
(184)
is concave and monotonically decreasing in x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
and for any 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1.
Proof. We proceed similarly to the proof of lemma 1. We
write f as
f(x) = 1 + φ(R)− φ(r) , (185)
this time with r =
√
1− x2 and R = √Q+ (1−Q)r2,
for which
r′ = −
√
1− r2
r
, r′′ = − 1
r3
, (186)
R′ = −
√
(1−Q)(1−R2)
R
, R′′ = −1−Q
R3
. (187)
The first derivative of f is
f ′(x) = φ′(R)R′ − φ′(r)r′
=
1
log(2)
[√
(1−Q)(1−R2)
2R
log
(
1 +R
1−R
)
−
√
1− r2
2r
log
(
1 + r
1− r
) ]
=
1
log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[√
(1−Q)(1−R2)
1−R2u2 −
√
1− r2
1− r2u2
]
=
√
1− r2
log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[
1−Q
1−R2u2 −
1
1− r2u2
]
= −Q
√
1− r2
log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
1− u2
(1− r2u2)(1−R2u2)
≤ 0 , (188)
where we used that
√
1−R2 = √(1−Q)(1− r2) to get
to the fourth line.
The second derivative of f is
f ′′(x) = φ′′(R)R′2 + φ′(R)R′′ − φ′′(r)r′2 − φ′(r)r′′
=
1
log(2)
[
−1−Q
R2
+
1−Q
2R3
log
(
1 +R
1−R
)
+
1
r2
− 1
2r3
log
(
1 + r
1− r
) ]
=
1
log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[
−1−Q
R2
(
1− 1
1−R2u2
)
+
1
r2
(
1− 1
1− r2u2
) ]
=
1
log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
[
(1−Q)u2
1−R2u2 −
u2
1− r2u2
]
= − Q
log(2)
∫ 1
0
du
u2(1− u2)
(1− r2u2)(1−R2u2)
≤ 0 . (189)
C. MAXIMAL NOISE PREPROCESSING
Thresholds to the Devetak-Winter rate can be computed
accurately in the limit q → 1/2 of maximal noise prepro-
cessing by setting q = (1− ε)/2 and then expanding the
expression for the key rate to the first nontrivial power in
ε [28]. For the BB84 bound (55) the result is
H(Z|E) ' 1− 1− 〈X⊗B〉
2
4|〈X⊗B〉| log2
(
1 + |〈X⊗B〉|
1− |〈X⊗B〉|
)
ε2 .
(190)
The approximate device-independent bound can be de-
rived by substituting |X ⊗ B| ≥ √S 2α /4− α2 and, for
|α| < 1, replacing part of the result with its tangent as
we did for the general entropy bound in section II.
To derive a generally useful approximation for the con-
ditional Shannon entropy we consider a joint probability
distribution pab of the form
pab =
pb + ε∆ab
nA
(191)
with
∑
a ∆ab = 0, i.e., such that
∑
a pab = pb. The joint
entropy of this distribution is
H(AB) = −
∑
ab
pab log2(pab)
= −
∑
ab
pb + ε∆ab
nA
log2
(pb + ε∆ab
nA
)
= −
∑
ab
pb + ε∆ab
nA
log2
[ pb
nA
(
1 + ε
∆ab
pb
)]
= −
∑
ab
pb
nA
(
log2(pb)− log2(nA)
)
−
∑
ab
pb + ε∆ab
nA
log2
(
1 + ε
∆ab
pb
)
= H(B) + log2(nA)
− 1
nA
∑
ab
(pb + ε∆ab) log2
(
1 + ε
∆ab
pb
)
≈ H(B) + log2(nA)
− 1
nA log(2)
∑
ab
(pb + ε∆ab)
(
ε
∆ab
pb
− ε2 ∆
2
ab
2p 2b
)
≈ H(B) + log2(nA)−
1
2nA log(2)
∑
ab
∆ 2ab
pb
ε2 .
(192)
Rearranging this gives
H(A|B) ≈ log2(nA)−
1
2nA log(2)
∑
ab
∆ 2ab
pb
ε2 (193)
for the conditional Shannon entropy.
In the applications we considered in this paper, Alice
always has two outcomes. In this case the distribution for
ε = 1 is
pab =
1
2 (pb ±∆b) (194)
with ∆b = p+b − p−b, and the approximation becomes
H(A|B) ≈ 1− 1
2 log(2)
∑
b
(p+b − p−b)2
pb
ε2 (195)
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in terms of the joint distribution pab before noise prepro-
cessing is applied.
In the special case that the probabilities P (ab|13) prior
to noise preprocessing being applied are of the form
P (++|13) = P (−−|13) = (1− δ)/2 , (196)
P (+−|13) = P (−+|13) = δ/2 , (197)
the approximation (195) gives
H(A1|B3) ≈ 1− (1− 2δ)
2
2 log2(2)
ε2 . (198)
This combined with the approximation for H(Z|E) above
recovers Eq. (10) in [28].
Losses turn an initial probability distribution p(ab) to
(p′ab) =
η2 p(++) η2 p(+−) ηη¯ pA(+)η2 p(−+) η2 p(−−) ηη¯ pA(−)
ηη¯ pB(+) ηη¯ pB(−) η¯2
 (199)
where η¯ = 1− η. Labelling the nondetection outcome ‘⊥’,
the sum in (195) after binning nondetections on Alice’s
side with ‘+’ evaluates to∑
b
(p′+b + p
′
⊥b − p′−b)2
pb
= η¯2 + ηη¯〈A〉(2 + η〈A〉)
+
η3
1− 〈B〉2
(
〈A〉2 + 〈AB〉2 − 2〈A〉〈B〉〈AB〉
)
, (200)
where
〈A〉 = pA(+)− pA(−) , (201)
〈B〉 = pB(+)− pB(−) , (202)
〈AB〉 = p(++)− p(−+)− p(+−) + p(−−) . (203)
For p(±±) = (1± cos(θ))/2 this gives
H(A1|B3)
≈ 1− 1
2 log2(2)
[(
η¯ + η cos(θ)
)2
+ η3 sin(θ)2
]
ε2 . (204)
D. MIN-ENTROPY AND Iβα BELL EXPRESSION
The lower bound∣∣〈X⊗B〉∣∣ ≥√S 2α /4− α2 (205)
we derived for |α| ≥ 1 and∣∣〈X⊗B〉∣∣ ≥ Eα(Sα) (206)
for |α| < 1 in section IV can be used to derive the tight
bound for the min-entropy in terms of Sα as well as the
conditional von Neumann entropy. The min-entropy is
defined as
Hmin(A1|E) = − log2
(
Pg(A1|E)
)
, (207)
where the guessing probability Pg(A1|E) is defined as
the highest probability with which an eavesdropper can
correctly guess the outcome when Alice measures A1. This
is given by
Pg(A1|E) =
∑
a
P (A1 = E) =
1
2
+
1
2
〈A1 ⊗ E〉 (208)
for whichever ±1-valued observable E on Eve’s system
maximises the right-hand side of (208).
Recalling that we identify A1 with Z, the correlation
term 〈A1 ⊗ E〉 is bounded by
〈A1 ⊗ E〉2 + 〈X⊗B〉2 ≤ 1 . (209)
This is implied, for instance, by the family(
1− cos(θ) Z⊗ 1B ⊗E − sin(θ) X⊗B ⊗ 1E
)2 ≥ 0 (210)
of sum-of-squares decompositions. The inequalities (209)
and (205) recover the tight upper bound
Pg(A1|E) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
1 + α2 − S 2α /4 (211)
for the guessing probability derived for |α| ≥ 1 in [11].
For |α| < 1 the qubit bound on the guessing probability
implied by (206) needs to be partly replaced with one of
its tangents, as we needed to do for the conditional von
Neumann entropy. The result of doing this is
Pg(A1|E) ≤
{
1
2 +
1
2
√
1 + α2 − S 2α /4 if |Sα| ≥ S∗
1− 1β∗ (|Sα|/2− 1) if |Sα| ≤ S∗
(212)
where
S∗ = 1 + α2 +
√
1− α4 (213)
and
β∗ =
2
α2
(
1−
√
1− α4
)
. (214)
Finally, we remark that, for E = 1, taking the family of
tangents to (212) together with the trivial bound |〈A1〉| ≤
1 gives
β〈A1〉+ Sα ≤
{
2
√
(1 + α2)(1 + β2/4) if |β| ≥ β∗
2 + |β| if |β| ≤ β∗
.
(215)
This confirms that the quantum bound
Iβα ≤ 2
√
(1 + α2)(1 + β2/4) (216)
derived for the Iβα expression in [11] for |α| ≥ 1 also holds
for |α| < 1 as long as the right side of (216) is greater
than the classical bound of 2 + |β|.
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